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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W. W. & W. B. GARDNER, INC., 




SUMMIT LIMITED, a California 
limited partnership, et al, 
Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Case No. 14814 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff against the 
cwners and developers of Park West Village, a subdivision lo-
cated in Summit County, Utah, to recover compensation for plain-
tiff's installation of asphalt paving throughout the subdivi-
sion. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On motion of plaintiff, the trial court on September 
22, 1976 entered default judgment and summary judgment against 
defendant Sumrr.it Limited. [R. 688-91). On October 12, 1976, 
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Summit Limited filed a Notice of Appeal with the district court. 
[R. 694]. On November 30, 1976, Summit Limited moved the lower 
court for relief from the judgment theretofore entered by that 
court. On December 8, 1976 the district court denied the motion 
of Summit Limited for relief from judgment. [R. 709-10]. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent requests that the district court's 
order granting summary judgment and default judgment against de-
fendant Summit Limited be affirmed. 
· IJ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July of 1972, Park West Village, Inc., a Utah cor-
poration, created a subdivision known as "Park West Village" in 
Summit County, Utah. [Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen pp. 10-11; R. 
523\ R. 121-22 (requests 1, 2, and 3); R. 249-51 (interroga-
tories 7, 8, 11, 18)]. The Park West Village subdivision con-
tained approximately thirty-nine lots of varying sizes. [R. 
5231]. On July 6, 1972, Park West Village, Inc. and others exe-
cuted a certain Subdivision Bond, which ran in favor of Summit 
County and secured the completion of all improvements upon the 
subdivision required by Summit County, including streets and 
roads. [Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen, pp. 22-23; R. 64; R. 122 (re-
quests 4, 5)]. 
Thereafter, Park West Village, Inc. conveyed the 
1/ The subdivision plat found at $. 523 is filed out of order 
and is Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's answers to interrogatc•ries 
found at R. 518-521. 
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subdivision to National Property Management, Inc., a California 
corporation, pursuant to a certain "Agreement" dated November 
15, 1973. [Deposition of Elwood L. Nielsen, p. 54, Exh. P-21; 
R. 636-639]. For the convenience of the Court, this Agreement 
is reproduced following the body of this Brief. 2 The Agreement 
in part provided that National Property Management would per-
form all obligations to comply with the requirements of Summit 
County concerning subdivisions, including the construction of 
roads. [Agreement, paragraph 21.E, Plaintiff's App. 9-10). 
Paragraph 23 of the said Agreement further provided that the 
Subdivision Bond was assigned to National Property Management 
and that National Property Management "agrees to perform all 
requirements of construction of said improvements as_ required by 
Summit County" and "agrees to render said improvements as re-
quired by this Paragraph and complete the same in a manner ac~ 
ceptable to Summit County by July 15, 1974." The vast majority, 
in dollar value, of improvements required by Summit County was 
represented by installation of streets and roads upon the sub-
division. [Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen, pp. 14, 22-23, 26-27; Exh. 
P-3: Depo. Robert Krause, p. 7-8.) As of the time that the 
Agreement was executed, therefore, National Property Management 
undertook to complete the paving of streets and roads within 
the subdivision. [Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen, p. 32). The Agree-
ment contemplated that Park West Village, Inc. would convey fee 
title to various parcels as National Property Management made 
'!:_/ Defendant Stull!Ilit Limtied included in its Brief an Appendix 
of various portions of the record, which Appendix will here-
after be referred to and cited as "Defendant's Appendix". 
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certain payments. Pursuant to this arrangement, Park West Vil-
lage, Inc. conveyed Lots 1. 4, 5, a portion of 16, 21, 23. and 
25 of the subdivision and an adjoining 3.6 acre tract to National 
Property Management. [R. 636]. 
On November 15. 1973, the same date upon which the 
Agreement referred to above (hereinafter, the "NPM Agreement") 
was executed, National Property Management conveyed the subdivi-
sion to Summit Limited. This second contemporaneous conveyance 
was accomplished through an "Agreement" strikingly similar to 
the NPM Agreement, which second agreement will hereinafter be 
referred to. as the "Summit Limited Agreement." The following 
provisions are contained in paragraph 21 of the Summit Limited 
Agreement: 
21. The parties hereto understand that 
Seller [National Property Management] has 
acquired the subject property from Park West 
Village, Inc., under an installment sale con-
tract. In the event of an antici ated de-
fault by Se er in its o igations un er said 
contract, Seller hereby agrees to assign all 
of its right, title, and interest in and to 
said contract to Buyer [Summit Limited] here-
under such that Bu er can assume Seller's 
losition in sai contract. Emp asis a ed) 
Defendant's App. 29;-~667]. 
As Summit Limited and National Property Management accurately 
predicted, National Property Management did default in its ob-
ligations under the NPM Agreement. [Depo." Elwood L. Nielsen, 
pp. 63-65]. Thereafter, National Property Management regarded 
the subdivision as the property of Summit Limited, [Depo. Richard 
Hallmark, p. 23], and Steven Bauer (then a limited partner and 
now the general partner of Sunnnit Limited) was in charge of 
the Park West Village Subdivision development. [Depo. Robert 
Krause, pp. 9-10]. Pursu~nt to the Summit Limited Agreement, 
-4-
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National Property Management then conveyed lots 1, 4, 5, 16, 23, 
and 25 of the subdivision to Surrnnit Limited. [R. 643]. Follow-
ing the execution of the Summit Limited Agreement, National Pro-
perty Management ceased development of the subdivision, and 
Surrnnit Limited was to commence improvement of the sub.division. 
[Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 13-14]. National Property Management 
is now insolvent and has no assets. [Depo. Richard Hallmark, 
p. 11]. 
After the foregoing machinations had been concluded, 
plaintiff W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. entered into a contract 
to install asphaltic concrete paving throughout the subdivision. 
[R. 623-27]. On its face, the contract purported to be between 
plaintiff and Ski Park City West, Inc., but in fact Ski Park 
City West, Inc. had absolutely no interest in or connection with 
the subdivision. [Depo. Robert Krause, p. 34; Depo. Richard 
Hallmark, pp. 21-22, 28]. Rather, Ski Park City West, Inc. was 
an entity closely related to SUIIUI1it Limited and National Pro-
perty Management. Plaintiff performed its obligations under 
its agreement and is owed approximately $38,000.00 therefor. 
[R. 625]. 
Critical to this case is the relationship between.a 
myriad of California-based organizations: Condor International 
Corp., Ski Park City West, Inc., National Property Management, 
Inc., and Summit Limited. 
Condor International Corp. ("Condor") is a California 
corporation. At all times material to this action, Richard 
Hallmark was the president of Condor [Depo. Richard Hallmark, 
p. 6] and Roy Webley was an officer of Condor [Depo. Robert 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Krause pp. 35-36]. At all times material hereto, Condor was the 
sole general partner of Summit Limited. [Depo. Richard Hallmark, 
p. 7; R. 671, Defendant's App. 55]. 
Ski Park City West, Inc. is a Utah corporation having 
connnon officers with Condor. Hallmark was a director and Vice-
President [Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 3], Webley was an officer 
[Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 35-36], and Robert Krause was a Vice-
President [Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 3-4, 25]. 
National Property Management is a Utah corporation that 
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ski Park City West, having com-
mon officers with both Condor and Ski Park City West. [Depo. 
Richard Hallmark, pp. 4, 6; Depo. Robert Krause, p. 4]. Hall-
mark was an officer [Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 3], and Krause 
was the President [Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 3-4, 25] of National 
Property Management. Ski Park City West and National Property 
Management acted as one entity, and had directors and managers 
that functioned in common. [Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 28; 
Depo. Robert Krause, p. 4]. 
Summit Limited is a California limited partnership that 
was organized by Roy Webley (an officer of both Condor and Ski 
Park City West) and Steven H. Bauer. [Depo. Robert Krause, p. 
5]. As already noted, Condor was the sole general partner of 
Summit Limited [Exhibit 3 to Depos. Hallmark and Krause; R. 672; 
Defendant's App., 57-58]. The Certificate of Limited Partner-
ship of Sunnnit Limited indicates its principal place of business 
as the same address as that of Condor and Messrs. Bauer, Webley, 
Hallmark, and Krause. [Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 3, 36-37; Depo. 
Richard Hallmark, p. 3]. 
-6-
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It is obvious from the foregoing that Summit Limited, 
Ski Park City West, National Property Management, and Condor 
International are all but component parts of an integrally con-
nected maze of California-based entities. Hallmark, who signed 
the contract with plaintiff, was the President of Condor, the 
general partner of Sunnnit Limited. Hallmark signed that docu-
ment at the behest of Roy Webley, also an officer of Condor and, 
not coincidentally, an organizer and limited partner of Sunnnit 
Limited. At a time when "Ski Park and National Property Manage-
ment were having their own financial problems," (both are now 
insolvent), Webley (a limited partner of Summit Limited) caused 
Hallmark (the President of the general partner of Summit Limited) 
tc execute the contract with plaintiff, purporte~ly on behalf of 
Ski Park City West, which had absolutely no interest in the sub-
division! [Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 11, 23]. 
The foregoing is the factual complex out of which this 
action arises. A discussion of the proceedings below that cul-




THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
If a party . . . fails (2) to serve 
answers or objections to interrogatories 
submitted under Rule 33, after proper ser-
vice of the interrogatories, or (3) to 
serve a written response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after 
-7-
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proper service of the request, the court in 
which the action is pending on motion may make 
such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others it may take any action 
authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) 
of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
Subdivision (b)(2), paragraph C of Rule 37 prescribes that the 
court may render "a judgment by default against the disobedient 
party." The trial court, pursuant to the rule just quoted, en-
tered a default judgment against defendant Summit Limit~d fer 
its persistent failure timely or properly to respond to plain-
tiff's discovery requests. [R. 690]. 
The actions of defendant Sunnnit Limited below reflect 
a persistent, knowing, and deliberate refusal to comply with the 
rules of civil procedure: 
1. On October 23, 1973, plaintiff duly served upon 
Summit Limited its First Set of Interrogatories. [R. 309; R. 
688). 
2. On July 6, 1976, plaintiff duly served upon 
Summit Limited its Third Set of Interrogatories. [R. 532; R. 
689]. 
3. On July 6, 1976, plaintiff duly served upon Summit 
Limited its Request for Admissions of Facts. [R. 541; R. 689]. 
4. On July 12. 1976, plaintiff duly served upon Summit 
Limited its Request for Production of Documents. [R. 587]. 
5. On August 9, 1976, plaintiff again duly served 
upon Summit Limited its Third Set of Interrogatories. [R. 608; 
R. 689]. 
6. On August 9, 1976, plaintiff again duly s~rved 
upon Summit Limited its Request for Admission of Facts. [R. 
608; R. 689] . 
-8-
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7. On August 9, 1976, plaintiff again duly served 
cpon Summit Limited its Request for Production of Documents. 
(R. 608). 
As of September 3, 1976, Summit Limited had responded 
to none of the above-described discovery requests. On that 
Gate, plaintiff served upon Summit Limited and filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. 
[R. 620). On September 15, 1976, after receipt of plaintiff's 
Motion, but prior to the hearing thereon, Summit Limited served 
upon plaintiff responses to (1) First Set of Interrogatories 
-- ten months late, (2) Third Set of Interrogatories -- one 
and one-half months late, and (3) Requests for Admissions of 
Fact -- one and one-half months late. [R. 655) .. Summit Limited 
to this day has not filed a response to plaintiff's Request for 
Production of Documents. 
Summit Limited in its Brief does not and reasonably 
cannot question the truth of the foregoing recitations of facts. 
Those facts conclusively demonstrate that Sunnnit Limited simply 
ignored plaintiff's discovery requests until it received plain-
tiff's motion to enter the default of Summit Limited, at which 
time Summit Limited in short order responded to all discovery 
requests save plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents. 
The trial court properly concluded that "the failure of Sunnnit 
Limited timely to respond to said discovery requests was with-
out excuse or justification," and that "the failure by defen-
dant Summit Limited timely to respond to plaintiff's said dis-
covery requests caused delay in the prosecution of these pro-
ceedings and substantial additional expense to plaintiff." 
-9-
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[R. 689]. The trial court accordingly entered a default judgment 
against Summit Limited. 
Summit Limited raises a number of obviously erroneous 
arguments in an effort to invalidate the lower court's order. 
Most of its arguments are spurious and can be disposed of sum-
marily. 
Sunnnit Limited first argues that since plaintiff amended 
its complaint on July 19, 1976, no response to any discovery re-
quest was due until 45 days thereafter. [Appellant's Brief, p. 
12). Rules 33(a), 34(b), and 36(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, all prescribe that responses to interrogatories, document 
requests, and requests for admissions, respectively, are due 30 
days after service of same except that a defendant is not re-
quired so to respond until "45 days after service of summons and 
complaint upon that defendant." Thus, the 45 day period for 
response only applies in the case of original service of sunrrnons 
and complaint upon the defendant. 3 Sunnnit Limited was served 
with summons and complaint on October 2, 1975 [R. 185] -- eleven 
months prior to service of Summit Limited's responses. Thus, 
the 45 day rule is obviously inapplicable here. Even assuming 
(as Summit Limited does throughout its Brief) that the 45 day 
period was applicable, Summit Limited was still substantially 
late in responding to those requests to which it did respond. 
Summit Limited secondly argues that Rule 37(d) autho-
rizes imposition of sanctions only for no responses, and not 
3/ The purpose of additional time for response following ini-
tial service is clear -- to enable defendant to engage counsel 
and prepare to defend. That object is clearly absent in the 
case of subsequent service of an amended complaint. 
-10-
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for tardy responses, to discovery requests. [Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 8-11]. This Court's adoption of that absurd argu-
ment would advise parties and counsel that they may cavalierly 
ignore discovery requests until a motion for sanctions is filed 
without fear of repercussion. Predictably, the courts and the 
language of Rule 37(d) reject Summit Limited's argument. Rule 
37(d) prescribes that a trial court can impose sanctions upon 
a party's failure to serve responses to discovery requests. 
The court in Naive v. Jones, 353 S.W. 2d 365 (Ky. 1961) con-
strued that clear language in the context of facts strikingly 
similar to those here presented. In ~aive, plaintiff filed 
answers to interrogatories three months late, after receiving 
a motion for sanctions but before the hearing of same. The 
trial court dismissed plaintiff's case and on appeal plaintiff, 
like Summit Limited, argued that the court lacked authority to 
dismiss under those circumstances. The appellate court, affirm-
ing, responded: 
Plaintiff's principal contention seems 
to be that the trial court lacked authority 
to proceed as it did. He contends there 
cannot be a violation of Rule 33 by mere de-
lay in answering, and the words "fails to--
serve answers" means that the party must 
absolutely and positively refuse to answer. 
This argument is not persuasive. Rule 33 
requires answers to be served within a spe-
cified number of days. If no answer is served 
within that time, then the party has failed 
to answer. Such a failure is itself a posi-
tive refusal to comply as required. Conse-
quently it constitutes a violation of Rule 
33 in the manner condemned by CR 37.05, 
which empowers the court to dismiss the ac-
tion. Id. at 366 (Emphasis original). 
Similarly, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Echols, 
138 Ga.App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742 (1976), the court, affirming a 
-11-
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dismissal for tardy responses to interrogatories, observed: 
Nor is there any significance in the fact 
that the plaintiff allegedly submitted answers 
to the propounded questions before the hearing 
on defendant's motion for sanctions. "[O]nce 
the motion for sanctions has been filed, the 
opposite party may not preclude their impo-
sition by making belated response at the hear-
ing." This applies as well to responses made 
in the interim between the filing of a motion 
for sanctions and the hearing on the motion. 
226 S.E.2d at 743. (Citations omitted). 
A number of other appellate courts have likewise af-
firmed dismissals or defaults imposed for tardy responses to 
interrogatories served after receipt of a motion for sanctions, 
but before the hearing of same. ~. United States v. Continen-
tal Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 91, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1962); Houston Gen-
eral Ins. Co. v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 134 Fla.App. 624, 215 
S.E.2d 511 (1975); Lynch v. R. E. Tull & Sons, Inc., 251 Md. 
260, 247 A.2d 287 (1968). Therefore, Judge Leary clearly had 
the power to enter the default of Surmnit Limited for its tardy 
filing of interrogatory responses, not to mention its complete 
failure to file a response to the request to production of docu-
ments as required by Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Third, Summit Limited seeks this Court's indulgence 
because Summit Limited was purportedly represented by a lay-
man -- Mr. Steven H. Bauer, its general partner. [Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 11, 12]. As plaintiff advised the lower court, Sum-
mit Limited's ostensible lay representation is nothing more 
than a fiction -- plaintiff's counsel at various times during 
these proceedings conunur:icated with the law firm of Rimel & 
Helsing of Santa Ana, California concerning Surmnit Limited's 
role in this case and indeed concerning the hearing of plain-
-12-
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tiff's motion for default judgment. [Defendant's App. p. 63-
64]. Each and every pleading filed in this case by SUIIIlilit Limi-
ted is filed on pre-printed pleading paper [R. 328, 615, 643, 
656, 660, 668, 670, 694, 696], and many bear the name of the 
Santa Ana, California law firm of Rimel & Helsing in the lower 
left-hand corner, [R. 329, 615 (masked), 694], and many utilize 
pre-printed mailing certificates. [R. 618 1 619, 655, 659, 694-. 
Finally, each paper filed in this case by Summit Limited bears 
the unmistakeable index of a lawyer's presence -- legal jargon 
and legalease. If Mr. Bauer would have this Court belive that 
he prepared those papers, he will concurrently convince this 
Court that he is quite learned in the law and not entitled to 
any leniency that might otherwise attach to his being ignorant 
of the law. At the very least, Mr. Bauer demonstrated that he 
knew how to respond to discovery when a default judgment was 
threatened. 
Finally, Sununit Limited raises the only genuine issue 
concerning the propriety of the lower court's default judgment 
-- Did the lower court abuse its discretion? [Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 12-15]. 
Appellant Summit Limited has a difficult burden on 
this facet of its appeal. In !ucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 
Ut~h 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), a case where as here defendant 
sought to reverse a default judgment entered for failure timely 
and fully to respond to discovery requests, this Court stated: 
We first note the basic premise on 
appeal: That the judgment is presumed to 
be correct, and that the burden of estab-
lishing its invalidity is upon the party 
attacking it. 396 P.2d at 412-13. 
-13-
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Further, a court's imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 
is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated: 
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an or-
der of court or for failure to respond are set 
out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are discretionary 
with the court. 
* * * 
In the absence of an absue of discretion, 
we should not undertake to substitute our idea 
of what is proper for that of the trial court. 
The law is stated in 5 Am.Jur 2d, Appeal and 
Error, as follow~~: 
* * * 
. [A] discretionary determination 
may be "reviewed" only in the case of a 
"gross " "clear " "plain " "palable " or "manif~st" abus~ of disc~etion. G.M. Leas-
in! Cor~. v. Murra~ First Thrift & Loan Co. , 
53 P.2 1244, 124 (Utah 1975). 
Under the circumstances presented in this case, no such abuse of 
discretion can be demonstrated. 
The record in this case demonstrates that Summit 
Limited was duly served with two sets of interrogatories, one 
request for production of documents, and one request for admis-
sions. Further, after Sunnnit Limited was out of time in respond-
ing to the third set of interrogatories, requests for admission, 
and request for production, plaintiff for the second time duly 
served those pleadings on Sununit Limited, The time for response 
pursuant to the second service of those pleadings also expired 
without response from Summit Limited. Only after Sunnnit Limited 
was served with plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and to 
enter default judgment did Sunrrnit Limited respond to any dis-
covery. In some cases, Sunnnit Limited's responses were ten 
-14-
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months late. Sunnnit Limited ~ filed a response to plain-
tiff's request for production of documents. Summit Limited's 
belated responses indicate that it knew how to respond, but did 
not choose to do so until faced with a default judgment. Summit 
Limited never sought an extension from either plaintiff or the 
Court. Moreover, it should be noted that each discovery request 
plainly stated on the first page the time within which a response 
was required. Finally, Summit Limited did not even bother to 
appear at the hearing of plaintiff's motion, but now argues that 
the trial judge erred in various respects that were never pre-
sented to the trial court. Upon the foregoing compelling facts 
and the authorities discussed below, it cannot be said that the 
trial court abused its discretion in entering the default of 
Summit Limited. 
This Court has twice affirmed the sanction of dismissal 
or default where a party fails fully or timely to respond to dis-
covery requests. In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 
2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), plaintiff moved the court for and 
obtained an order of production. 4 At the pretrial conference, 
the court directed defendant to produce pursuant to the prior 
order.. Thereafter, the defendant produced some documents, but 
did not produce others that defendant had theretofore indicated 
existed. Plaintiff moved for a default judgment, which the 
trial court granted, On appeal, this Court affirmed, emphasizing 
4/ Prior to the 1972 amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, a request for production absent an order of.the co~rt was 
not permitted; presently, of course, no such order is required. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 34 (Volume 9, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) and 1975 Supp.). 
-15-
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the discretionary character of a trial court 1 s imposition of 
sanctions: 
Whether the failure to comply with the court's 
order had been wilful and whether the circum-
stances are so aggravated as to justify the ac-
tion taken is primarily for the trial court to 
determine. Unless it is shown that his action 
is without su~port on the record, or is a plain 
abuse of discretion, it should not be disturbed. 
396 P.2d at 412-13. 
Likewise, in Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974), plain-
tiffs brought an action against defendants, husband and wife. 
Defendants'~ ("not an attorney of record in Utah," 522 P.2d 
at 701) prepared an answer, which his parents signed, served, 
and filed. Thereafter, plaintiffs served interrogatories and 
requests for admissions upon defendants. One and one-half 
months after such service, plaintiffs served defendants with a 
motion for sanctions, pursuant to which the court ordered that 
answers be filed within ten days. One and one-half months later, 
defendants not having answered, the court on motion entered the 
default of defendants. Defendants then retained counsel, who 
filed a petition to set aside the default, which petition was 
denied by the trial court. This Court affirmed the trial court, 
reasoning as follows: 
It is true as defendants assert that this 
court has on numerous occasions declared as 
a matter of general policy that whenever the 
interests of justice and fair play will be 
served thereby, the trial court should exer-
cise its discretion liberally in favor of 
giving the parties an opportunity for a hear-
ing on the merits of a case. However, dis-
cretion is not a one way street. As is some-
times said: No pancake can be fried so thin 
that it does not have two sides. Both par-
ties have rights which it is the res onsi-
1 ity o tne tria court to protect. In 
•ituations where the exercise of discretion 
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is a ro riate, considerable wei ht should 
oe iven to t e etermination 0 t e trraT 
court, whichever way it goes, T is is true 
oecause due to his close involvement with 
the parties, the witnesses and the total 
circumstances of the case,'he is in the 
best position to judge what the interests 
of justice require in safeguarding the 
rights and interests of all parties con-
cerned. Id. at 701-02 (Emphasis added). 
Significantly, in ~arber, defendants were apparently represented 
by a layman and only four and one-half months elapsed between 
service of two discovery requests and entry of defendants' de-
fault. Here, four discovery requests were served -- most were 
~erved twice -- and eleven months elapsed between service of 
some and the entry of default judgment. Although in Barber no 
responses were filed by defendants, and hence the Court had no 
way of knowing whether the lay defendants understood the neces-· 
sity of response, here Summit Limited proved that it knew how 
to respond, but only after being faced with the prospect of de-
fault. 
It has been demonstrated above that the district court 
clearly had the power to enter a default judgment against Summit 
Limited for its eleventh hour responses to some requests and its 
outright failure to file a response to the request for produc-
tion of documents. Summit Limited emphasizes that it did even-
5 tually respond to the requests. Nevertheless, compelling con-
siderations of policy demand that the lower court be affirmed. 
If a lower court abuses its discretion by imposing 
sanctions under the circumstances presented here, the recipients 
5/ Summit Limited consistently overlooks the fact that it has 
never filed a response to the request for production as required I 
by Rule 34 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ll 
il 
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of discovery requests in the future may safely ignore the same un-
til served with a motion for sanctions, at which time they may 
serve their tardy responses without fear of substantial detriment. 
If the discovery rules are to serve their purpose without con-
stant participation by and imposition upon the courts, those rules 
must be respected. Such considerations have motivated the courts 
to uphold default judgments under circumstances less aggravated 
than those presented here. 
In Spradling v. Boone County Planning Corrrrn., 461 S.W. 
2d 548 (Ky. 1970), the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed a trial 
court's dismissal against a plaintiff that served answers to in-
terrogatories only one month late, after a motion for sanctions 
but before the hearing of same. The court noted that defendant 
had sought no extension and reasoned as follows: 
In the case of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Company v. Carrier, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 938. the 
court said there is a presumption that the 
Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to pro-
vide litigants with swift and speedy relief. 
In sustaining the default judgment because 
of delay, this court said at page 941: "If 
the Rules of Civil Procedure are to servethe 
ur ose for which the desi the 
I . at Emp 
Similarly, in Lynch v. R.E. Tull & Sons, Inc., 251 Md. 260, 247 
A.2d 287 (1968), the court affirmed the trial court's entry of 
a default judgment against a defendant that served answers to 
interrogatories only four months late, after service of a mo-
tion for sanctions but before the hearing of same, reasoning that 
defendant was flagrantly dilatory. That defendant's dilatori-
ness was minor compared to that of Summit Limited. Again, in 
Houston General Ins. Co. v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 134 Ga. 
App. 624, 215 S.E.2d 511 (1975), United States v. Continental 
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Cas. Co., 303 F,2d 91 (4th Cir, 1962), and Naive v. Jones, 353 
S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1961), the courts under virtually identical cir-
cumstances affirmed default judgments entered after tardy res-
ponses were filed. In none of the foregoing cases had the trial 
court entered any order compelling responses prior to entry of 
the default judgment. 
Rule 37(d) authorizes the action taken by the district 
court. The district court found that Sunnnit Limited's conduct 
was "without excuse or justification" and "caused delay in the 
prosecution of these proc:eedings and substantial additional ex-
pense to plaintiff." [R. 689]. Those determinations find sub-
stantial support on the record. Sunnnit Limited, which did not 
see fit even to appear at the hearing of plaintiff's motion 
and give the district court the benefit of its views, is in no 
position now to argue that the district court abused its dis-
cretion. Further, after hearing the arguments of Sunnnit Limi-
ted' s present counsel at the motion for relief from the de-
fault judgment, the trial court found that "Sunnnit Limited has 
failed to demonstrate any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, ex-
cusable neglect, or any other reason ju~tifying relief from 
this operation of the judgment. [R. 710]. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Before addressing the propriety of the district court's 
sunnnary judgment, the body of facts to be considered, as re-
vealed by the record, must first be ascertained, The statement 
of facts contained in the beginning of this Brief derive only 
from the depositions, affidavits, and answers to interrogatories 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on file in this case -- no reliance was there placed upon the 
deemed admissions of Summit Limited, which are discussed below. 
We submit that those facts, unaided by the deemed admissions of 
Summit Limited, support the lower court's judgment, However, if 
this Court concludes, as did the lower court, that by failing 
timely to answer plaintiff's request,s for admission, the requests 
were admitted, plaintiff is unquestionably entitled to its judg-
ment. 
A. Surrnnit Limited is bound b its failure 
to respond to ~ ainti s requests or 
admissions of act. 
Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(a) * * * 
Each matter of which an admission is re-
quested shall be separately set forth. The 
matter is admitted unless, within 30 da S"atter 
service o t e request, or wit in suc1 s orter 
or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves 
u on the arty re uestin the admission a writ-
ten answer or o jection a resse to t e mat-
ter, signed by the party or by his attorney. 
* * * 
(b) An matter admitted under this rule is 
the court 
On July 6, 1976, and again on August 9, 1976, plaintiff duly 
served upon Summit Limited its Request for Admission of Facts. 
[R. 541, 608, 689]. That pleading on the first page contained 
the following language: 
Each matter hereinafter set forth will be 
deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after 
the service of this Request for Admission upon 
-20-
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said defendant, said defendant serves upon 
the undersigned a written answer or objec-
tion addressed to the matter, signed by 
said defendant or its attorney, 
Surrrrnit Limited did not respond to plaintiff's request for admis-
sions until after plaintiff served its motion for summary judg-
ment. [R. 668]. Surrrrnit Limited's response was served 71 days 
after the fir.st service and 47 days after the second service by 
plaintiff. Summit Limited at no time sought leave of the court 
to file tardy responses, nor did Sunnnit Limited move the court 
pursuant to Rule 36(b) to withdraw or amend its admissions that 
occurred upon its failure timely to respond, 
This Court on a number of occasions has affirmed sum-
mary judgments based upon a party's admissions arising from his 
failure to respond to requests for admissions. - In Bennion v. 
Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 (1972), this Court utilized 
such a failure to respond to establish the admissions there in 
question and observed: 
Rule 36 provides that each matter of which 
an admission is requested is deemed ad-
mitted if not answered within the time re-
uired. 500 P.2d at 516 n. 10 (emphasis 
added . 
Again, in Williams v. Greene, 29 Utah 2d 141, 406 P.2d 64 (1973), 
the Court stated: 
(D]efendant, under the discovery process, 
requested admission of facts (R~le.36, ~tah 
Rules of Civil Procedure). Plaintiff did 
not respond thereto and the court accepted 
the facts requested, as he properly was sup-
posed to do, as being true, under Rule 45 
[sic]. Defendant filed a motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, which, we conclude, pro-
perly was granted. 500 P,2d at 65. 
Finally, in Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County Comm., 14 Utah 2d 151, 379 P.2d 379 (1963) (per curiam), 
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the Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, which was 
based upon admissions arising from defendant's failure to respond, 
stating: 
Under Rule 36, the facts requested are deemed to 
be admitted. Sunnnary Judgment accordingly was 
entered for plaintiff. 379 P.2d at 379. 
There exists no question, therefore, that in this jurisdiction 
deemed admissions arising from a party's failure to answer may 
properly provide the basis for a summary judgment. The language 
of Rule 36 and the decisions of other courts conclusively estab-
lish that the same result obtains with respect to tardy responses. 
In Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 68 F.R.D. 
63(~.D.W.Va. 1975), Belco served requests for admission on Weva 
and, one and one-half months thereafter, moved for summary judg-
ment based upon Weva's deemed admissions. Prior to the hearing 
of the motion for SUllllllary judgment, Weva filed responses and 
moved the court for leave tardily to file such responses, as-
serting that the delay was caused by a clerical error in the of-
fice of Weva's attorney. The court entered summary judgment 
reasoning that permitting such tardy responses would prejudice 
Belco by requiring it to prove the deemd admissions and stated: 
[W]ere the court to grant relief on the facts 
here presented, i.e., an alleged procedural er-
ror, unsupported by affidavit, deposition, or 
otherwise, in the office of a non-responding 
party's attorney, the result would be to totally 
nullify the time requirements set forth in Rule 
36(a). The court has been directed to and can 
locate no decision, with a fact situation simi-
lar to those presented in this action, where 
relief was granted for untimely response. Id. 
at 667 (Emphasis added), 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Mexico offered the 
following analysis respecting responses to requests that were 
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filed seventeen days late. 6 
"It is clear that, under our Rule 36 and 
the identical federal rule, either the 
unexcused late filing of an answer to 
requests for admissions or the filing of 
an unsworn answer is equivalent to the 
filin of no answer accordin to the 
terms o t e ru e itse and to innumer-
able decisions on that question. . . . 
Robinson v. Navajo Frei5ht Lines, Inc., 
70 N.M. 215, 372 P.2d 8 , 804 (1962). 
Likewise, in Lawrence v. Southwest Gas Corp. , 89 Nev. 
446, 514 P.2d 869 (1973), the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed 
a summary judgment upon facts strikingly similar to those here 
presented: 
Pursuant to NRCP 36(a), the appellant's 
(plaintiffs below) were served with a formal 
request to admit certain facts. Appellants 
served neither timely answers nor timely ob-
ject ions, and then they admitted facts that 
negatived the existence of the claims alleged 
in their Amended Complaint. Thereafter, with-
out moving for permission to withdraw or amend 
their admissions, appellants filed a belated 
"Answer to Demand for Admissions," purporting 
to deny the matters already admitted by op-
eration of NRCP 36. On motion, the district 
court granted summary judgment, from which 
appellants have appealed, contending that 
the district court "abused its discretion." 
Assuming the district court had dis-
cretion to relieve appellants of their ad-
missions, on its own motion, our review of 
the record satisfies us that in this case 
the court was justified in not doing so. 
514 P.2d at 869. 
To the same effect, on almost identical facts, see Salem v. 
Lawyers Co-Operative Pub. Co., 137 Ga.App. 536, 224 S.E.2d 502 
(1976). 
6/ The court, however, did not consider the deemed admissions 
because they were never offered into evidence at trial. 
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Based both upon the express langauge of Rule 36(a) and 
the foregoing authorities, Surrnnit Limited's failure timely to 
respond to plaintiff's requests for admission effected a conclu-
sive admission of the facts requested and provides an unassail-
able basis for the trial court's summary judgment. Any argument 
that Summit Limited may advance that its tardy responses negated 
its deemed admissions is refuted by the express language of Rule 
36(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: "Any matter admitted un-
der this rule is conclusively established unless the court on 
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." (Em-
phasis added). Summit Limited never so moved the court below. 
In Sims Motor Transportation Lines v. Foster, 293 S.W. 
2d 226 (Ky. 1956), the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the 
trial court properly refused to permit the recipient of re-
quests for admission to file tardy responses because the reci-
pient party had never moved the court to withdraw his deen1ed 
admissions pursuant to Rule 36(b). The appellate court in 
~ountain View Enterprises v. Diversified Systems, 133 Ga.App. 
249, 211 S.E. 186 (1974) squarely held that a trail court has no 
discretion to accept tardy responses as negating deemed admis-
sions unless the responding party so moves the court pursuant 
to Rule 36(b). There, the appellate court reversed the trial 
court's denial of a motion for surrnnary judgment because the 
trail court improperly ignored deemed admissions: 
Code Ann. §81A-136(a) [almost identi-
cal to U.R.C.P. Rule 36(a)] ... states 
clearly that as to request for admissions 
the matter is admitted unless answers or 
objections are filed to such request within 
30 days after service of said request ... 
The defendant waited until motion for sum-
mary judgment was filed before answering. 
'l /. 
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The court has discretion in such matter 
onl! when a party moves to determine the 
suf iciency of answers or objections filed 
to the re uest. Here there were no timelv 
o ·ections nor answers unti after the pas-
sage o_ ays, an t e reqeusts were a -
mitted as a matter of law. [Citation omitted]. 
!{hen defendant finall filed his answers to 
request or admissions, ays a ter service, 
he made no motion that he be granted the pri-
vilege of filing at that late day. 211 S.E. 
2d at 187 (Emphasis added). 
Accordingly, because Summit Limited never moved the trial court 
to withdraw its deemed admissions or to file its tardy response, 
the trial court did not even have the Eower to ignore the deemed 
admissions. 
Sunnnit Limited seeks to generate a "genuine issue of 
material fact" through the Affidavit of Steven H. Bauer. [R. 
660]. That Affidavit, however, as a matter of law, cannot af-
fect the conclusive effect of Summit Limited's deemed admissions. 
Rule 36(b) provides that "[a]ny matter admitted under this rule 
is ~onclusively established." The courts have construed that 
clear language to preclude modification of an admission by af-
fidavit or otherwise. In Creel v. Government EmEloyees Ins. Co., 
313 So.2d 772 (Fla.App. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 336 So. 
2d 1170 (Fla. 1976), for example, defendant served requests for 
admissions upon plaintiff, who did not respond but rather filed 
an affid~vit controverting part of the requests. Thereafter 
the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that his affidavit, which controverted 
his deemed admissions, precluded sunnnary judgment. The appellate 
court held that the plaintiff's deemed admissions were conclu-
sive, and the affidavit was legally ineffectual to vary or con-
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trovert the deemed admissions. The Supreme Court of Nevada 
similarly concluded in ¥estern Mercury Ins. v. The Rix Co., 84 Nev. 
218, 438 P.2d 792 (1968). There, the court held that deemed ad-
missions, in the context of a motion for summary judmgnet, can-
not be varied by the party's contrary answers to interrogatories. 
By the express terms of Rule 36 and the authorities just dis-
cussed, the Bauer Affidavit cannot, as a matter of law, affect 
the conclusive effect of the admissions of Summit Limited. The 
trial court properly relied upon the admissions of Sunnnit Limi-
ted in granting sunnnary judgment against Sunnnit Limited: 
7. Because defendant Summit Limited failed 
timely to serve responses to plaintiff's said Re-
quest for Admission of Facts, which were twice 
served upon defendant, the matters contained 
therein are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 36, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. * * * [R. 689-
90]. 
Based upon those admissions, plaintiff is unquestionably entitled 
to its sunnnary judgment against Summit Limited. 
B. There exists no genuine issue of fact respt~cting 
the liability of Sunnnit Limited to Plaintiff. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribes 
that summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any moving fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." The trial court found, as re· 
quired by Rule 56(c), as follows: 
9. The pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavit of J. C. Wheelwright 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and that plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law as moved 
against defendant Sunrrnit Limited, (R. 690]. 
The Affidavit of Mr. Wheelwright and the admissions of Sunrrnit 
Limited, without more, establish that the district court was 
correct in its ruling. The admission by Summit Limited of 
request numbers 12, 13, and 14 [R. 543-44] conclusively estab-
lish the following facts: 
1. On July 8, 1974, plaintiff and Summit 
Limited through its agent, Ski Park City West, 
entered into the contract attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the admissions. [Request 12, R. 543, 
R. 545]. 
2. Under the parties' said contract, 
plaintiff. agreed to perform various grading, 
paving, and related work upon the subdivision. 
[Request 12, R. 543]. 
3. Under the terms of the parties' con-
tract, Summit Limited agreed, through its 
agent Ski Park City West, Inc., to pay plain-
tiff for such work within ten days of the 
completion of same. [Request 12, R. 543-44]. 
4. Plaintiff has completed its agreed 
performance under the parties' contract and all 
conditions precedent to plaintiff's right to 
compensation have been satisfied. [Requests 
13, 14; R. 544]. 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the par-
ties' contract, Summit Limited owes to plain-
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tiff the sum of $38,196.65, together with in-
terest thereon at the rate of twelve percent 
per annum from and after August 8, 1976, un-
til paid, less the sum of $2, 081. 60. [R. 623-
26]. 
As established in the preceding section, the matters established 
through Summit Limited's admissions (items 1, 2, 3, and 4 above) 
are conclusively established and cannot be varied by affidavit 
or otherwise. With respect to the matters contained in item 4 
above, the affidavit of J. C. Wheelwright is uncontroverted. 
Based only upon the admissions of Summit Limited and the Wheel-
wright Affidavit, therefore, summary judgment was properly 
granted to plaintiff. The balance of the record likewise sup-
ports that conclusion. 
The Statement of Facts contained in this Brief, which, 
as noted therein, places no reliance on Summit Limited's admis-
sions, establishes that Condor International, Summit Limited, 
Ski Park City West, and National Property Management had corrrrnon 
officers, organizers, and partners. In many cases, these or-
ganizations' officers functioned in common and did not distin-
guish the affairs of one entity from another. By the NPM Agree-
ment, National Property Management purchased the subdivision and 
connnitted itself to pay for the installation of paved streets 
throughout the subdivision. [Plaintiff's App. p. 9 , paragraph 
21.E]. Pursuant to the Summit Limited Agreement, which was 
executed concurrently with the NPM Agreement, Surrrrnit Limited 
"[i]n the event of an anticipated default by [National Property 
Management]" could "assume [National Property Management's] 
'Hl _ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
position" in the NPM Agreement. [Defendant's App. 29, paragraph 
21; R. 667]. National Property Management did default, and 
Surrrrnit Limited assumed its position in the NPM Agreement, receiv-
ing from National Property Management a conveyance of all sub-
division lots therefore conveyed to National Property Manage-
ment. [R. 643]. Thereafter, National Property Manageme' 
ceased development of the subdivision, and Steven Bauer and 
Surrrrnit Limited were to commence development of the subdivision. 
[Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 23; Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 9-10, 
13-14]. Plaintiff then entered into a contract executed by 
Ski Park City West, the agent of Summit Limited. [R. 543, 545). 
Hallmark, who signed the contract with plaintiff, was the 
President of Condor, the then-general partner of Summit Limi-
ted. Hallmark signed the contract pursuant to instructions by 
Roy Webley, also an officer of Condor and organizer and limited 
partner of Summit Limited. At the time that the contract was 
executed, Ski Park City West had absolutely no interest in the 
subdivision and both it and National Property Management were 
having financial difficulties -- both are now insolvent. [Depo. 
Richard Hallmark, p. 11, 23]. Thus, it is clear that both fac-
tually and contractually, Summit Limited, the owner of the sub-
division, through its agent, Ski Park City West, which had no 
interest in the subdivision, entered into and became respon-
sible to pay pursuant to the contract with plaintiff. Although 
Summit Limited, through the Bauer Affidavit, states that "[i]t 
is my information and belief that at no time did SKI PARK CITY 
WEST, INC. act in the capacity as an agent or in any other 
capacity on behalf of SUMMIT LTD." [R. 661], Mr. Bauer's affi-
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davit is not credible -- In answers to interrogatories, Mr. 
Bauer indicates that because he was not the general partner of 
Summit Limited at the time, he does not know who was to procure 
or be responsible to pay for the paved roads upon the subdivi-
sion. [Interrogatory No. 14; Defendant's App. 35-36; R. 313, 
644). It must be again emphasized, however, that neither affi-
davit nor interrogatories may vary the conclusive admissions 
of 8ummit Limited, which entitle plaintiff to the summary judg-
ment now on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Summit Limited did not appear at the hearing that re-
sulted in the judgment here on appeal, nor did it present any writ-
ten argument to the district court in connection with that hear-
7 ing . Each and every argument presented in the Brief of Summit 
Limited was not presented to the district court. Under well es-
tablished principles of appellate review, those arguments cannot 
properly be considered for the first time by this Court. State 
y. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 818 (1972); Simpson v. General 
Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970). 
The trial court properly found that Summit Limited, with-
out excuse or justification, persistently refused to respond to 
plaintiff's four separate discovery requests, most of which were 
served twice, in a timely fashion. Sununit Limited has still not 
LI Seventeen days passed between service of Notice of the hear-
ing and the hearing itself. [R. 620, 633, 688). The record is 
devoid of any explanation why Sunnnit Limited did not attend the 
hearing. 
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filed a response to plaintiff's request for production of docu-
ments, and Summit Limited's response to plaintiff's first in-
terrogatories was ten months late. Rule 37(d) empowered the 
trial court to enter the default of Surmnit Limited both for its 
outright failure to respond and its tardy responses which were 
prompted by plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Under the circum-
stances presented here, Summit Limited's assertion that the 
entry of default against it amounted to an abuse of discretion 
cannot be taken seriously. 
The record reflects that Summit Limited did not respond 
timely to plaintiff's requests for admissions and never moved 
the court, as clear1y required by Rule 36(b), to be relieved of 
its admissions effected by operation of Rule 36(a). Those con-
clusive admissions, which cannot be varied by eleventh hour af-
fidavits and interrogatory responses, unquestionably entitle 
plaintiff to summary judgment, as the district court found. 
Summit Limited, which never moved below to be relieved of its 
admissions and never complained below of the nature or charac-
ter of its admissions, cannot properly now deny or seek to be 
relieved of those admissions by this Court. 
Both the default judgment and the summary judgment en-
tered by the district court are supported by the record. The 
district court's Judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMLTTED this/~ day of April, 1977. 
MARTINEAU & MAAK 
Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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[R. 558] 
AGREEMENT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT made this 15th day of November, 
1973, by and between PARK WEST VILLAGE, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion hereinafter designated as "Seller", and NATIONAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter designated 
as "Buyer" of 647 Camino De Los Mares, San Clemente, California 
92672. 
2 WITNESSETH: That the Seller for the consideration 
herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the Buyer and 
the Buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to 
purchase the real property situate in Sunnnit County, State of 
Utah k~own as Park West Village and more particularly described 
in the Title Policy attached hereto as Exhibit A. Seller rep-
resents that a portion of said real property is included in a 
subdivision more particularly described on the Plat, recorded 
as entry #116341 with the Summit County Recorder and that said 
subdivision consists of certain sold and unsold lots as more 
particularly set forth on the Inventory attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. The lot numbers on said Inventory relate to said 
Plat and the unsold lots designated thereon are included with-
in the real property which is the subject of this Agreement. 
The lots designated as having been sold on said Inventory in-
clude lots sold by deed and by contract and are not part of 
the sub.i ect of this sale. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession 
and pay for said premises the sum of $485,000.00, payable at 
App. 1 
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the office of Seller his assigns or order, 24 South Main Street, 
Logan, Utah 84321. strictly within the following terms, to-wit: 
$110,000.00 cash on or before December 13. 
1973, and the balance of $375,000.00 shall be paid 
as follows: 
$31,000.00 plus interest accrued on the total 
balance as of the date of the payment on March 1, 
1974; $30,000.00 plus accrued interest accrued on 
the total balance 
[R. 559) 
as of the date of the payment on the 15th day of 
Augu~t and the 15th day of December of each of 
the years 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 and 
for August 15, 1979, with a payment of $14,000.00 
plus interest accrued to date as of December 15, 
1979. 
The Buyer may pay a maximum of $120,000.00 principal plus any 
interest accrued, per year. In the event that pre-payment of 
any amount above this is made, the Buyer shall pay a penalty of 
an additional $21,250.00 in any given year in which said maxi-
mum requirement of payment is exceeded. Possession of said 
premises shall be delivered to Buyer on the date of the first 
payment. From the date hereof until possession is delivered 
or until Buyer has defaulted under this Agreement, Buyer shall 
have access to the property to make surveys, soil tests and to 
conduct other engineering activities. 
App. 2 
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4. Interest shall be charged from the date hereof on 
all unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of 8 
1/2% per annum. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller 
accepts payment from the Buyer on this Contract less than ac-
cording to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing it will 
in no way alter the terms of the Contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated or as to any other remedies of the Seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an 
obligation against said property in favor of Earl and Anna 
Pressler which has been assigned to Downey State Bank with an 
unpaid balance of $18,000.00 as of December l,_ 1973, which ob-
ligation is to be paid by Seller. 
7. The Seller agrees to release and convey fee simple 
title to parcels of land to the Buyer upon receipt of amounts 
listed with respect to each parcel as set froth on Exhibit C 
and in accordance with the terms specified therein. 
8. Seller represents that there are no unpaid spe-
cial improvement district taxes covering improvements to said 
premises now in the process of being installed or which have 
been completed and not paid for. 
9. Buyer Rnd Seller agree that they will not mort-
gage or otherwise enctnnber any unreleased property which is 
the subject matter of this Contract; however, Buyer may record 
a notice of this Contract at its election. 
10. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed and 
which may become due on these premises during the life of this 
App. 3 
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Agreement. 
[R. 560] 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes due and 
payable after the date hereof. 
12. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable 
buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in an amount not less than the ap-
praised value thereof and to insure the shop for a minimum amount 
of $20,000.00 and to include the Seller as a co-insured party as 
his interest may appear and to deliver a certificate with res-
pect to such an insurance policy to Seller. 
13. In the event the Buyer shall default in the pay-
ment of any special or general taxes, assessments, or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the seller may, at his option, pay 
said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either of 
them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to 
repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced and 
paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of pay-
ment of said sums at the rate of 3/4 of one percent per month 
until paid. 
14. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to 
be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon said 
premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good con-
dition. 
15. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any 
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payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 
sixty (60) days thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall 
have the following alternative remedies: (The sixty (60) day 
grace period shall not apply to the Buyer's obligation to pay 
$110,000.00 cash on or before December_ 13, 1973). 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon 
failure of the Buyer to remedy the default 
within five days after written notice, to be 
released from all obligations in law and in 
equity to convey said property, and all pay-
ments which have been made theretofore on 
this contract by the Buyer, shall be for-
feited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the nonperformance of the contract, and the 
Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option 
reenter and take possession of said premises 
without legal processes as in its first and 
[R. 561] 
former estate, together with all improvements 
and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and 
the said additions and improvements shall re-
main with the land and become the property of 
the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant 
at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and re-
cover judgment for all delinquent installments, 
App. 5 
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including costs and attorney's fees. (The use 
of this remedy on one or more occasions shall 
not prevent the Seller, at his option, from re-
sorting to one of the other remedies hereunder 
in the event of a subsequent default); or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at 
his option, and upon written notice to the BLyer, 
to declare the entire unpaid balance hereunder at 
once due and payable, and may elect to treat this 
Contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title 
to the Buyer subject thereto and proceed imme-
diately to foreclose the same in accordance with 
the laws of the State of Utah, and have the pro-
perty sold and the proceeds applied to the pay-
ment of the balance owing, including costs and 
attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judg-
ment for any deficiency which may remain. In the 
case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon 
the filing of a Complaint, shall be immediately 
entitled to the appointment of a receiver to 
take possession of said mortgage property and 
collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom 
and apply the same to the payment of the obliga-
tion hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to 
order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry 
of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to 
the possession of the said premises during the 
period of redemption. 
App. 6 
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16. It is agreed that time is the essence of this 
Agreement. 
17. Seller will make available to Buyer all cost 
accounting 
[R. 562] 
infonnation relating to construction of improvements on the 
subject property. 
18. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by 
the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property in 
its present condition and that there are no representations, 
covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto wit~ re-
ferenc~ to said property, except as herein specifically set 
forth or contained in the attached exhibits. 
19. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they 
default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fees, which may arise or ac-
crue from enforcing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession 
of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy pro-
vided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether 
such remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise. 
20. This Contract is assignable by the Buyer. How-
ever, Buyer shall give written notice of any s~ch agreement 
and provide a copy thereof to Seller. 
21. The parties acknowledge that there are certain 
outstanding liquidated and unliquidated potential liabilities 
App. 7 
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or liens or encumbrances relating to the property which is the 
sub.i ect of this Contract, all of which Seller represents are 
described below. An itemization of these matters is not to be 
construed as an admission by the Seller that any said claim is 
in fact a valid or existing liability but is merely a statement 
as to the manner in which any such potential problem will be 
handled as between the Buyer and the Seller. 
A. Title Insurance Policy. 
The Buyer accepts the property, subject to the liens and 
encumbrances set forth in the Title Insurance Policy. 
B. Building and Occupancy Restrictions and Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Park 
West Village Condominium -- Phase I and Phase II. 
[R. 563] 
The Seller has previously caused to be filed with the 
County Recorder of Summit County, Building and Occupancy Restric-
tions, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and 
Declarations, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Park 
West Village Condominium (the "Declarations") attached hereto 
as Exhibit E. Seller represents that identical Declarations 
are recorded against both Phase I and Phase II of the Park 
West Village Condominium project. The Seller hereby assigns 
all of its right, title and interest in and to the Building 
and Occupancy Restrictions and the Declarations to the Buyer 
including, but not limited to, the right to appoint the member-
App. 8 
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ship of the Subdivision Management Conrrnittee and agrees to 
deliver to Buyer a certified copy of the resolution of its 
Board of Directors effecting such appointments. In the event 
of a default hereunder, all rights under said Building and Oc-
cupancy Restrictions and the Declarations shall immediately 
revert back to the Seller and the Seller shall have the sole 
right to exercise all powers set forth therein. The Buyer 
agrees with Seller and for its benefit that while there is any 
portion of the real property not released pursuant to Section 
7 hereof, it shall abide by and enforce all of the provisions, 
covenants and obligations of the Building and Occupancy Res-
trictions and the Declarations and to pay all costs and ex-
penses incidental thereto. 
D. Subdivision Master Plan. 
The Buyer acknowledges that a Subdivision Master Plan, 
attached hereto as Exhibit F and incorporated herein by re-
ference has been used in the promotion and development of the 
subject property. The Buyer agrees to comply with said Master 
Plan insofar as may be necessary to prevent the Seller from 
accruing liability which may result from a deviation from the 
Master Plan and to hold the Seller harmless from any liability 
accruing in the event that the Buyer chooses to deviate from 
the Master Plan. 
E. Summit County Subdivision Rules, Regulations 
and Requirements. 
The Buyer agrees that it is purchasing the project as 
is and that it will perform all duties, responsibilities and 
App. 9 
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obligations to comply with the rules and regulations of Summit 
County as it may generally apply to 
[R. 564] 
subdivisions and with the specific requirements imposed by Sum-
mit County with respect to this subdivision project, including, 
but not limited to, the construction of roads. 
22. The Seller hereby conveys to the Buyer the sole 
right to use the name Park West Village and agrees to change 
its name. In the event of an unrectified default by the Buyer, 
the rights to the name shall revert to the Seller. 
23. The Seller presently has an arrangement witr. Tracy 
Collins Bank·& Trust whereby it has borrowed $30,000.00 and 
deposited the same in the form of a Certificate of Deposit 
which is the subject of a contract whereby the Certificate of 
Deposit is pledged to guarantee the performance of the construc-
tion of lots as required by Summit County for the Park West 
Village subdivision. The Buyer agrees to perform all require-
ments of construction of said improvements as required by Sum-
mit County. The Certificate of Deposit, which is guaranteeing 
the construction of these improvements and the loan at Tracy 
Collins Bank & Trust, is hereby assigned to the Buyer, who 
agrees to pay the interest on the $30,000.00 loan. The interest 
will be paid to the Seller at its address stated herein, and 
the Seller will then pay Tracy Collins Bank & Trust. The 
Buyer agrees to hold the Seller harmless from any claim by 
App. 10 
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Tracy Collins Bank & Trust for this obligation, and the Buyer 
agrees to pay the $30,000.00 loan in full, which it may do by 
offsetting the Certificate of Deposit against said loan upon 
the completion of the requirements of Summit County and the 
receipt from Summit County of the discharge of the bond obli-
gation. Seller agrees to cooperate in the preparation of any 
supplemental documentation or in any other way reasonably neces-
sary to complete the provisions of this Paragraph. The Buyer 
agrees to render said improvements as required by this Para-
graph and complete the same in a manner acceptable to Summit 
County by July 15, 1974. In the event that the Buyer fails 
to complete the improvements by that date, then the Seller may 
complete said improvements and in that event, the Buyer agrees 
to pay to the Seller $15,000.00 liquidation damages and costs 
of the imprcvements, with the $15,000.00 payable on July 20, 
1974, and the costs of improvements payable upon the comple-
tion of the same. In the event of a default, the default shall 
[R. 565] 
constitute a reassignment to the Seller of the Certificate of 
Deposit at Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, and the Buyer shall 
thereupon reassign the obligation to pay the loan balance and 
the Certificate of Deposit, or the proceeds thereon may be 
used to render the required improvements. In the event of a 
default by the Buyer, under the terms of this Contract, the 
Buyer shall remain liable to pay all interest accruing after 
the date of this Contract at Tracy Collins Bank & Trust. 
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24. All water rights appertaining to the subject pro-
perty shall be conveyed to the Buyer at the time the property par-
cels are released. The parties who own dwelling units on lots in 
Park West Village subdivision as of the date of this Contract 
shall have the right to tie in and connect to Park West Water As-
socation, a nonprofit Utah corporation, and to acquire and tc 
have the ability to acquire water at association rates in effect 
from time to time. The Buyer agrees to assume any obligation 
which the Seller may have and to hold the Seller harmless there-
from to provide water to the buyers of lots in Park West Village 
Subdivision which have not yet constructed a dwelling thereon. 
The right of the existing dwelling o>mers under this Paragraph 
shall not be abrogated in the event that the Seller exercises 
its rights un9er Paragraph 15. 
25. The payment due on or before December 13, 1973, 
from Buyer to Seller is subject to the Seller providing Warranty 
Deeds subject to existing mortgages at First Security Bank and 
Title Insurance Policies on the five condominium units, numbers 
4, 10, 12, 14, and 16, which are the subject of a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract of even date herewith. The Seller's duty under 
this Paragraph is to deliver said Warranty Deeds and Title In-
surance Policies to Summerhays, Hatch & Lawrence, and Summer-
hays, Hatch & Lawrence shall deliver said Warranty Deeds and 
Title Insurance Policies to the Buyers upon the receipt of pay-
ment of the cash difference between the mortgage balances and 
$34,700.00 on units 4, 14, and 16, and $36,700.00 on units 10 
and 12. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this Agreement 
. App. 12 
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have hereunto signed their names, the day and year first above 
written. 
PARI< WEST VILLAGE, INC., Seller 




MENT, INC., Buyer 
By: /s/ Robert Krause 
President 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Plaintiff-Respondent were served this /~ day of April, 1977, 
by mailing on said date two copies thereof, United States Mail, 
first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Timothy R. Hanson, Esq. 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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